Accuracy benchmark · 25 September 2026

Frozen pre-repair result

Accuracy measured against retained first-party evidence.

We tested a reproducible, stratified sample of 200 advisories across 20 vendors. The benchmark measures whether SVXtream preserved and normalised the vendor's product, version, CVE and remediation facts correctly—not whether a field merely had the right shape.

99.98%

Fact precision

5,925 correct facts and one incorrect fact among stored assertions reviewed.

99.61%

Fact recall

Twenty-two source facts were missing from the sampled records.

200/200

Core benchmark passes

Every sampled record passed the defined relationship, CVE, guidance and evidence contract.

20

Vendors represented

Ten advisories were selected per vendor using the recorded sampling method.

The 200/200 result applies to the defined core relationship, CVE, guidance and evidence contract. The wider fact review found one incorrect fact and 22 missing facts across 18 advisories. It is not a claim of perfect or database-wide accuracy.

Results by measure

Applicable records passed every core field check.

Not-applicable records are shown separately and excluded from each field denominator. Confidence ranges are 95% Wilson intervals.

5,925

Correct facts

1

Incorrect fact

22

Missing facts

0

Unsupported facts

MeasurePassFailN/ARate95% interval
Affected product/applicability19703100.0%98.1–100.0%
Affected version145055100.0%97.4–100.0%
Fixed version157043100.0%97.6–100.0%
Remediation19406100.0%98.1–100.0%
Complete advisory CVE set19406100.0%98.1–100.0%
Explicit product-scoped CVE link19208100.0%98.0–100.0%
Source-evidence chain20000100.0%98.1–100.0%

Observed defects

What the fact review found.

The expanded review found 23 defects in 18 of the 200 sampled advisories across nine vendors. The misses were concentrated in normalised impact statements, with two absent vendor scores and one incorrect product-scoped score fact.

“Missing” means the fact was absent from the normalised canonical fields at the reviewed revision. The same wording may still have been retained in free text or a source artifact.

20

Missing

Impact statements

Twenty source-stated impact statements were absent from normalised impact rows across 15 advisories.

2

Missing

CVSS scores

Two Adobe-authored CVSS 3.1 scores were absent from normalised score rows.

1

Incorrect

CVSS vector

One product-scoped CVSS vector used the wrong attack-complexity metric.

No identified defect in this sample involved affected or fixed version attribution, product applicability, remediation, CVE membership or source evidence.

Representative findings

These examples show the difference between a complete source statement and the normalised fields measured in the frozen review.

MissingImpact statement

Debian

DLA-4705-1

The normalised record held one impact row, but four additional vendor-stated consequences were absent: header injection, brute-force protection bypass, server-side request forgery and file disclosure or exfiltration.

MissingCVSS score

Adobe

APSB24-78

Adobe's CNA CVSS 3.1 score for CVE-2024-45145 was absent from the normalised score rows: 5.5 Medium with vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N.

IncorrectCVSS vector

Atlassian

CVE-2025-9287

The Jira Software product score used AC:H, while its product narrative supported AC:L. The correction follows the product narrative and preserves Atlassian's conflicting structured value as a publisher conflict.

See all 18 affected advisories
VendorAdvisoryDefectData affectedFinding in the frozen review
AdobeAPSB24-78MissingCVSS scoreAdobe CNA CVSS 3.1 score for CVE-2024-45145 was absent.
AdobeAPSB25-29MissingCVSS scoreAdobe CNA CVSS 3.1 score for CVE-2025-27197 was absent.
AtlassianCVE-2025-9287IncorrectCVSS vectorThe Jira Software product score used the wrong attack-complexity metric.
Amazon Web Services2026-029-AWSMissingImpact statementLinux-kernel privilege-escalation consequence was absent.
DebianDLA-3631-1MissingImpact statementX-server crash consequence and its configuration and event prerequisites were absent.
DebianDLA-4705-1MissingImpact statementsFour calibre consequences were absent: header injection, protection bypass, SSRF and file disclosure or exfiltration.
DebianDSA-6128-1MissingImpact statementPossible cross-site scripting consequence in Shaarli was absent.
GitLabGITLAB-CVE-2024-2454MissingImpact statementCrafted-request denial of service in the pins endpoint was absent.
GitLabGITLAB-CVE-2024-3114MissingImpact statementRegular-expression denial of service while parsing invalid commits was absent.
GitLabGITLAB-CVE-2026-1747MissingImpact statementUnauthorized modification of protected Conan packages was absent.
KubernetesCVE-2020-8557MissingImpact statementNode-storage exhaustion and node-failure consequence was absent.
Palo Alto NetworksCVE-2023-6789MissingImpact statementStored JavaScript execution and actions disguised as another administrator were absent.
Palo Alto NetworksCVE-2024-0010MissingImpact statementMalicious JavaScript execution, phishing and possible credential theft were absent.
Palo Alto NetworksPAN-SA-2016-0006MissingImpact statementURL-filter bypass with its insider-only scope and negative qualifications was absent.
Palo Alto NetworksPAN-SA-2016-0032MissingImpact statementAuthentication-token theft and API-call consequence with its browser-access prerequisite was absent.
SiemensSSA-925850MissingImpact statementUnauthorized cross-project queries by an authenticated Polarion ALM user were absent.
UbuntuUSN-8183-1MissingImpact statementMalicious-microcode loading and loss of integrity or confidentiality was absent.
UbuntuUSN-8638-1MissingImpact statementsThree Axios consequences were absent: two SSRF statements and one HTTP-header injection statement.

Repair status

The sampled defects were restored.

The accepted repair restored all 23 sampled facts and covered related historical cases across 118 existing advisory identities. Post-write validation checked 6,420 records with no material delta, QA failure or reconstruction error.

This is repair evidence, not a post-repair rescore. The 99.98% precision and 99.61% recall figures remain the frozen pre-repair benchmark.

Methodology

Designed to be repeatable and difficult cases stayed in scope.

The benchmark deliberately revisited vendors implicated in preceding defect rounds. This tests whether corrections held while the recorded seed makes the advisory selection reproducible.

01

Define the eligible population

Vendors needed at least ten active advisories. The frozen canonical snapshot contained 60,643 advisories, 56,628 unique CVEs and 1,116,262 product rows.

02

Select a reproducible, stratified sample

Eighteen previously defect-bearing vendors were required and two were selected by ascending SHA-256 rank. Ten advisories per vendor and one relationship per advisory were ranked separately from the recorded seed.

03

Compare with retained vendor evidence

Each sampled relationship and the applicable advisory-wide facts were checked against retained first-party payloads. Complete CVE and CWE membership were included; external enrichment was excluded.

04

Freeze results before repair

The measurement was preserved before corrections. Findings could then be repaired without retrospectively improving the published benchmark result.

Recorded seed
80c7f15d206468e4dad1e128c9765d4edd13dc2847b7bce13bec95aec120fbfb
Evidence checked
1,094 artifact links and 1,334 retained payload hashes
Revision verification
778 revisions covering 13,767 recorded changes

Vendor representation

Ten advisories from each of 20 vendors.

“Required” vendors were carried forward from the preceding defect round. Docker and JetBrains were selected from the remaining eligible vendors by the recorded seed. Seven passing records contained disclosed conflicts within vendor-source material.

VendorSelectionEligible populationPassVendor conflicts
ABBRequired69100
AdobeRequired339102
AtlassianRequired418101
Amazon Web ServicesRequired179100
CiscoRequired77100
CitrixRequired24101
DebianRequired2,801100
DockerSeed-ranked78100
GitLabRequired510100
IBMRequired1,221100
IntelRequired630100
JetBrainsSeed-ranked367100
Juniper NetworksRequired30103
KubernetesRequired91100
NVIDIARequired172100
Oracle LinuxRequired4,949100
Palo Alto NetworksRequired177100
Red HatRequired7,112100
SiemensRequired593100
UbuntuRequired1,307100

A vendor-source conflict records contradictory or inconsistent first-party material. It remains visible in the data and does not count as an SVXtream failure when the source conflict is represented accurately.

What the result does not claim

Limitations are part of the result.

Publishing the boundaries prevents a sample result from being mistaken for a universal guarantee or an independent certification.

Test the evidence against your own priority vendors.

Choose three vendors and compare representative SVXtream records with the first-party publications and your existing advisory workflow.

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